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Article 6

THE LAWYER MEETS THE
APPRAISER-WITNESS
John C. Burke*
In any condemnation case, the appraiser is one of the more
important witnesses. Upon his testimony, his knowledge, his
demeanor, his presentation, and the jury's acceptance or rejection
of the same, may well depend the attorney's case. The author,
no strangerto the appraiser-witness,emphasises the need for pretrial consultation between the attorney and the appraiser,pointing
out many of the more common pitfalls of which the attorney and
his witness should be aware.
The Editors
I.
It is

. . .

INTRODUCTION

indispensable to the administration of justice that

a witness should not be turned into an advocate, nor an advocate
into a witness.
Lord Chief Justice Campbell - 18561
Not too many years ago, expert testimony concerning value
was looked upon with distrust and suspicion by both lawyers and
judges as well as by laymen. Real estate appraisers were fair

*

1

LL.B. 1951, Creighton University; Member Nebraska Bar Association;
presently Tax Attorney, Douglas County, Nebraska, and Department
of Roads Representative for condemnation trials in Douglas County.
This quotation is taken from Lord Chief Justice Campbell's charge
to the jury in the famous trial of William Palmer. Palmer was
charged with the murder of one Cook by poisoning, the trial being
held within Central Criminal Court, Old Bailey, London, in the year
1856. The reports of the trial differ in some minor respects. One report
quotes the pertinent part of the charge as follows:
With regard to the medical witnesses, I must observe that,
although there were among them gentlemen of high honor,
consummate integrity and profound, scientific knowledge, who
came here with a sincere wish to speak the truth, there
were also gentlemen whose object was to procure an acquittal
of the prisoner. It is, in my opinion, indispensable to the administration of justice that a witness should not be turned into
an advocate nor an advocate into a witness.
For a complete report of the trial, see: Knott, Trial of William Palmer,
Cromarty Law Book Co., Philadelphia (1912).
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game for the cold, pointed pen of the fact minded jurist.2 However,
in recent years, real estate appraisers have made rapid strides in
gaining the confidence of the legal profession and the general public. The appraisement of real property is fast being reduced to a
science, and the expert real estate appraiser in condemnation cases
has recently been characterized as "that scoundrel who stands between the landowner and sudden wealth."
Today, expert testimony on value is the accepted and perhaps
the only practical method of proving value in condemnation cases.
For purposes of this paper, it is assumed that the lawyer
confronted with the trial of a condemnation case has selected the
best real estate appraiser available; one who will qualify as an
expert at the time of trial. The lawyer is now ready to sit down
with the expert and prepare the case for trial.
II.

CONFERENCE WITH APPRAISER

The trial of a condemnation case requires the utmost preparation and coordination by the lawyer-appraiser "team." The lawyer, of course, occupies the role of the advocate; the appraiser
plays the dual role of teacher and salesman.
It is not unnatural that an appraiser of strong conviction, yet
honest and unpurchasable, should become the earnest advocate of
his theory and somewhat over zealous in his testimony. Yet, this
is a pitfall for the lawyer to avoid in the trial of a condemnation
case. Once the appraiser becomes an advocate, his effectiveness
before the jury is diminished and the ends of justice are not
served. On the other hand, the lawyer is not required to select a
lukewarm, half-convinced appraiser. The solution to this perplexing problem appears to lie in a thorough understanding by the appraiser of what his function is to be in the forthcoming trial. The
function of the appraiser ". . . is to present an appraisal of the property, setting forth his independent valuation conclusion, doing

2

The court in Sands v. City of New York, 172 N.Y.S. 16, 18 (1918)
stated: "Facts, not the purchased opinions of professional witnesses,
count with courts. The naked, arbitrary opinions of men who call
themselves 'experts' are of little value.". See: Ferguson v. Hubbel,
97 N.Y. 507, 514, 49 Am. Rep. 544, 549 (1884), where the court said:
"It is generally safer to take the judgment of unskilled jurors than
the opinions of hired and generally biased experts."; also Winans v.
N.Y. & N.E. Ry., 62 U.S. 88, 101 (1858), where a judge of the Supreme
Court of the United States declared: ". . . experience has shown that
opposite opinions of persons professing to be experts may be obtained
to any amount."
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it in such a manner that his recitation becomes a clear, coherent
and convincing story. It is not his function to win the lawsuit."'
The appraiser must not be left with the impression that he carries
the whole case on his shoulders and must decide questions that
ought to be left to the jury.
In addition to testifying at the trial of the condemnation action, it is the function of the appraiser to assist the lawyer in
the preparation of his case. He should bring to the lawyer a
complete knowledge of every fact and circumstance bearing on
the property to be taken. Nothing is more devastating to the
testimony of the appraiser than to have it brought out in crossexamination that he is unfamiliar with or has overlooked certain
facts having a definite effect on the market value of the property.
The landowner is familiar with every inch of his property and
the improvements thereon. He is generally acquainted with every
real estate transaction in recent years in the vicinity of his property. In a recent condemnation trial in Douglas County, the
landowner had lived on his farm for seventy-three years. If you
are representing the landowner, he will serve as a valuable crutch
for your appraiser in his search for the facts. If you are representing the appropriator, it simply means that your appraiser
will have to work all the harder to gather the information necessary for his presentation.
Inasmuch as the appraiser will necessarily, occupy the role
of a teacher before the jury, it is important that he know something about the background and education of his pupils so that
he can gear the level of his presentation accordingly. Hence, it
is advisable that the lawyer and the appraiser sit down together
prior to the time the appraiser takes the witness stand and discuss
the information gained from the jurors on voir dire examination.
If one of the jurors has had technical training in an allied field,
it might be that the lawyer would want the appraiser, as a matter
of strategy, to direct a complicated aspect of his presentation to
that particular juror with the hope that the juror would "carry
the ball" for him on that particular phase of the evidence when
the jurors retire to the jury room. Further, the appraiser should
be encouraged to use visual aids in his presentation. Visual aids
should be so prepared that they may be received in evidence and
taken by the jurors to the jury room.
When it was stated that the appraiser would also play the
role of a "salesman," the writer did not mean to imply that it
3 See Watson A. Bowes, The Function of the Appraiser in Condemnation,

The Appransal Journal, July 1958.
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was the function of the appraiser to "sell" his opinion to the
jury. Neither was it implied that it was his function to take the
stand as a bought and paid for witness of a party. Nevertheless,
it is the function of the appraiser to influence the thinking of
the jury and to convince the jurors that the techniques used and
the facts assembled by the witness in making his appraisal were
fair, necessary and just in order to arrive at the fair market value
of the property. In view of the fact that the jury has the absolute right to evaluate expert testimony and to determine what
weight should be given it or any part of it, in the light of all
the general facts and circumstances developed at the trial, and
of its own common knowledge and ordinary experience, 4 the appraiser must be encouraged to "dress up" his presentation so
that it will be interesting and understandable. A "cold" presentation by the appraiser, like the reading of a deposition, is of
little help to the lawyer in his efforts to obtain a favorable verdict
for his client.
III. FORMULA FOR DAMAGES
After having received the detailed written appraisal submitted by the appraiser, it then becomes the work of the lawyer
to fit together the data in such a manner that the appraiser will
be allowed to testify at the trial concerning the facts which he
has gathered and the conclusions which he has reached. Generally, the appraiser will know little about rules of evidence
and he will rely heavily upon the lawyer for guidance in this
respect.
The courts have not all agreed on the formula for measuring
damages in partial taking cases. However, two formulas seem to
be in wide use, namely:
Just compensation = Fair market value of tract taken plus fair
market value of remainder before taking minus fair market value
of remainder after taking.
Just compensation = Fair market value of the whole tract before
taking minus fair market value of remaining tract after taking.
4

In Burnett v. Central Neb. Public Power & Irr. Dist., 125 F.2d 836,
838, (8th Cir. 1942), Judge Johnsen remarked: ". . . a jury in an ordinary condemnation case .. .must accordingly be permitted to exercise
this power of deliberative flexibility, which is one of the principle
virtues of our jury system, and it cannot arbitrarily be required to
return a verdict within the mathematical limitations fixed by the expert witnesses for the parties." See also: Jones v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 104 Neb. 735, 178 N.W. 611 (1920); Lincoln Land Co., v.
Phelps County, 59 Neb. 249, 80 N.W. 818 (1889).
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Formerly in Nebraska, it was held to be,
a proper course to take the opinion of experts as to the value
before it is affected by the location of the road. This done, the
testimony on the question of damages should be confined to those
matters affecting the value, proper to be considered, leaving the
jury to draw their own inferences therefrom, unaffected by the
judgment of others.5

However,
ination of the
has used both
decisions hold

this holding has since been modified." An examcase law reveals that the Nebraska Supreme Court
formulas interchangeably.7 Nevertheless, the later
that the proper formula is:

Just compensation = Fair market value of tract taken plus fair
market value of remainder before taking minus fair market value
of remainder after taking.

This formula has been criticized because the appraiser, in
estimating the value of the part taken as a part of the whole,
arrives at a value that is likely to be considerably in excess of
the separate sale value of the part taken; and in calculating
damages, the formula encourages him to make allowance for
damages though none in fact may have been sustained.8 In otherwords, this formula is based on the assumption that the value
of an organic whole can somehow be spread out or apportioned
among the parts of that whole in such a way that the sum of
the values of the parts constitutes the value of the whole.0
5 Fremont E. & M. V. R.R. Co. v. Whalen, 11 Neb. 585, 591, 10 N.W.
491, 493 (1881).
6 Republican V. R.R. v. Arnold, 13 Neb. 485, 14 N.W. 478 (1882).
7 Republican V. R.R. v. Arnold, 13 Neb. 485, 14 N.W. 478 (1882);
Blakeley v. Chicago K. & N. R.R. Co., 25 Neb. 207, 40 N.W. 965
(1888); Burlington & M. R. Co. v. White, 28 Neb. 166, 44 N.W. 95
(1889); Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Buel, 56 Neb. 205, 76 N.W. 571
(1898); Stull v. Department of Roads and Irrigation, 129 Neb. 822,
263 N.W. 148 (1935); McGinley v. Platte Valley Public Power and Irrigation Dist., 133 Neb. 420, 275 N.W. 593 (1937); Wahlgren v. Loup River
Public Power Dist., 139 Neb. 489, 297 N.W. 833 (1941); Langdon v. Loup
River Public Power Dist., 142 Neb. 859, 8 N.W.2d 201 (1943), Rev. on
App. 144 Neb. 325, 13 N.W.2d 168 (1944); Kennedy v. Department of
Roads and Irrigation, 150 Neb. 727, 35 N.W.2d 781 (1949); Medelman v.
Stanton-Pilger Drainage District, 155 Neb. 518, 52 N.W.2d 328 (1952).
8 1 Orgel, Valuation under Eminent Domain, 64 (2d ed. 1953).
9 1 Orgel, Valuation under Eminent Domain, 52 (2d ed. 1953), at p. 238.
"Thus, if half of a homogeneous farm plot is taken, and if the whole
farm is worth $10,000, it will be assumed that each half is worth
$5,000, and this assumption will persist in the mind of the valuer
even though he may be aware that each half could be sold separately
for only $3,000 and that, therefore, the taking of either half reduces
the market value of the whole by $7,000 and not merely by $5,000."
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Of course, if the property is not actually taken but is "damaged"
within the meaning of the Nebraska Constitution, the following
formula would be used:
Just compensation = Fair market value of the whole tract before
damage minus fair market value of whole tract after damage.' 0
IV. HEARSAY
As a result of the conference with your appraiser, it will
undoubtedly be brought out that some of the information upon
which he bases his opinion of value has a hearsay basis. It is
inevitable that there is some intermixture of hearsay with expert
opinion evidence.
The courts have generally held that an expert may testify
as to value even though his conclusions are based to some extent
upon hearsay evidence. Chief Justice Holmes, when a member
of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, stated:
An expert may testify to value although his knowledge of
details is chiefly derived from inadmissible sources, because he
gives the sanction of general experience. But the fact that an
expert may use hearsay as a ground of opinion does not make
the hearsay admissible."1
For example, the fact that the expert chiefly relied on hearsay information regarding the selling price of a comparable tract
of land in forming his opinion of the value of the tract of land
under condemnation would not render his opinion inadmissible.
Nevertheless, the actual selling price of the same tract of compar12
able property could not be shown by hearsay evidence.
V. COMPARABLE SALES
The appraiser in the course of making his appraisal undoubtedly discovered sales of comparable properties which would be
of help to the lawyer in the presentation of his case chiefly
10 Quest v. East Omaha Drainage District, 155 Neb. 538, 52 N.W.2d 417

(1952). In connection with "damage" without "taking" read about
the sad fate of Gillespie's saloon in Gillespie v. City of South Omaha,
79 Neb. 441, 112 N.W. 582 (1907).

11 National Bank of Commerce v. City of New Bedford, 175 Mass. 257, 56
N.E. 288, 290 (1900). See also H. & H. Supply Co. v. United States,
194 F.2d 553 (10th Cir. 1952); Bridgeport Hydraulic Co. v. Town of
Stratford, 139 Conn. 388, 94 A.2d 1 (1953); 5 Vand. L. Rev. 432 (1952);

12

Wahlgren v. Loup River Public Power Dist., 139 Neb. 489, 297 N.W.
833 (1941).
State v. Wright, 105 Neb. 617, 181 N.W. 539 (1921).
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as a means of establishing the value of the real property under
consideration.
The majority of jurisdictions follow the so-called "Massachusetts rule" which allows the introduction of this type of evidence on direct examination. 13 The minority of jurisdictions adhere to the "Pennsylvania rule" and exclude such evidence on
direct examination. 14 Prior to the year 1943, Nebraska followed
the "Pennsylvania rule" and refused to admit evidence of the
sales of comparable properties on direct examination.'"
However, in 1943, the Nebraska Supreme Court joined the majority
of jurisdictions by adopting the "Massachusetts rule."'16
Now, the lawyer may introduce evidence of particular sales
of other land as independent proof of value where a foundation
is laid which indicates that the prices paid represented the market
value of such land, that the sales were made at or about the
time of the taking by condemnation and that the land sold was
substantially similar in location and quality to that condemned.' 7
Inasmuch as no two pieces of property are identical, no
positive rule can be laid down to fix definitely the degree of
similarity, the nearness of time of the sales and the distance of
the property sold to justify the admission of proof of such sales.
Whether the properties are sufficiently similar to have some
bearing on the market value of the land under consideration
must necessarily rest in the sound discretion of the trial court.
It should be noted, however, that evidence of prices paid by
a condemner for other land similar in location and quality and
paid at or about the time of taking by condemnation is inadmis-

13

Patch v. Boston, 146 Mass. 52, 14 N.E. 770 (1888).

See Annot. 118

A.L.R. 870 (1939), 174 A.L.R. 386 (1948); 36 Cornell L. Q. 137 (1950).
'4

"5

16

17

East Pennsylvania R.R. v. Heister, 40 Pa. 53 (1861).
Chicago R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Griffith, 44 Neb. 690, 62 N.W. 868 (1895)
(dictum); Union P.R. Co. v. Stanwood, 71 Neb. 150, 91 N.W. 191 (1902)
(dictum), Rehearing 71 Neb. 158, 98 N.W. 656 (1904); State v. Wright,
105 Neb. 617, 181 N.W. 539 (1921); Rushart v. Department of Roads and
Irrig., 142 Neb. 301, 5 N.W.2d 884 (1942); Swanson v. Board of Equalization, 142 Neb. 506, 6 N.W.2d 777 (1942).
Langdon v. Loup River Public Power District, 142 Neb. 859, 8 N.W.2d
201 (1943), Rev. on App. 144 Neb. 325, 13 N.W.2d 168 (1944).
City of Lincoln v. Marshall, 161 Neb. 680, 74 N.W.2d 470 (1956); Lynn
v. City of Omaha, 153 Neb. 193, 43 N.W.2d 527 (1950); Papke v. City

of Omaha, 152 Neb. 491, 41 N.W.2d 751 (1950).
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sible.' s The courts base their exclusion of this evidence on the
ground that a sale to a condemner is, in effect, a forced sale and
does not furnish a criterion for market value.
In fairness to all parties concerned, it would seem that the
lawyers should disclose, at the pre-trial conference, the sales of
comparable property which they intend to introduce on direct
examination in order that an investigation might be made concerning the facts underlying the sales. Further, it would appear
that the trial judge should place a reasonable limitation on the
number of comparable sales to be introduced and thereby prevent
too many collateral issues which would confuse the jury and
unduly prolong the trial.
VI. ADAPTABLE USES
In determining the fair market value of the land under condemnation, the great majority of jurisdictions adhere to the view
that the value should be considered in view of any reasonable
use to which the land may be applied and all the reasonable uses
to which it is adapted. The minority of jurisdictions determine
the value in view of the "value for the best use."' 19 Nebraska
follows the majority rule and if the property, by reason of its
surroundings or otherwise is physically adaptable to some particular use, present or potential, all of the circumstances making
up this adaptability may be brought out by the lawyer in the
presentation of his case. 20
Although the fact of this particular adaptability of the property may be brought out, the expert is not allowed to give his
opinion concerning the value of the property for a specific purpose but must state its market value in view
of any purpose
21
to which it is presently or potentially adapted.
The catch-phrase "highest and best use" has crept into the
jargon of the appraiser, but it would be well to advise your
appraiser not to use the phrase in his testimony because it will
Is Lynn v. City of Omaha, 153 Neb. 193, 43 N.W.2d 527 (1950); Papke v.

City of Omaha, 152 Neb. 491, 41 N.W.2d 751 (1950); State v. Wright,
105 Neb. 617, 181 N.W. 539 (1921).

19 1 Orgel, Valuation under Eminent Domain, 30 (2d ed. 1953).
20 Langdon v. Loup River Public Power District, 144 Neb. 325, 13 N.W.2d
168 (1944); Medelman v. Stanton-Pilger Drainage District, 155 Neb. 518,
21

52 N.W.2d 328 (1952).
Lynn v. City of Omaha, 153 Neb. 198, 43 N.W.2d 527 (1950); Alloway
v. Nashville, 88 Tenn. 510, 13 S.W.2d 123 (1890).
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only lead to trouble. The Nebraska Supreme Court in Langdon
v. Loup River Public Power District,22 held that it was error for
the trial court to instruct the jury to determine the value of
the damage to the property in the light of "its highest and best
purposes."
The next question confronting the lawyer is: What uses
will the trial court consider as falling within the sphere of "all
reasonable uses to which the land is adapted"?
In the case of Olson v. United States, 23 Mr. Justice Butler
answered the question in the following language:
Elements affecting value that depend on events or combinations of occurrences which, while within the realm of possibility,
are not fairly shown to be reasonably probable, should be excluded
from consideration, for that would be to allow mere speculation
and conjecture to become a guide for the ascertainment of valuea thing to be condemned in business transactions as well as in
judicial ascertainment of truth.
In United States v. Foster,2 4 Judge Gardner stated:
To warrant the admission of testimony as to value for purposes
other than that for which it is actually used, however, regard must
be had for the existing conditions and wants of the community,
or such as may reasonably be expected in the immediate future.
The uses considered in fixing value must be so reasonably probable
as to have an effect upon the present market value of the land
and a speculative value cannot be considered.
Therefore, if the lawyer intends to present testimony by the
appraiser of the adaptability of the land for purposes other than that
for which it is actually.used, he must be prepared to show:
(1) That the land is adaptable to the other use.
(2) That the "wants of the community" would make the
other use reasonably probable within the immediate
future.
(3) That the present market value of the land has been
thereby enhanced.
Because the physical adaptability of the land alone cannot
be deemed to affect market value, it is incumbent upon the
lawyer clearly to demonstrate, through the testimony of the appraiser, that there is a demand in the market for this particular
22
23
24

144 Neb. 325, 331, 13 N.W.2d 168, 172 (1944).
292 U.S. 246, 257; 54 S. Ct. 704, 709; 78 L. Ed. 1236, 1245 (1933).
United States v. Foster, 131 F.2d 3, 5 (8th Cir. 1942). See also, United
States v. 711.57 Acres of Land, 51 Fed. Supp. 30 (1943).

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

use and that because of this demand, the value of the land has
been presently enhanced. The presentation of this proof is one
of the most difficult barriers that the lawyer for the landowner
has to hurdle in the trial of a condemnation case.
A situation might arise where it is claimed that the land
has several adaptable uses. It is not necessary that an appraiser
be familiar with, have knowledge of, and take into consideration
every possible use. 25

What uses the appraiser

considered in

reaching his opinion can be brought out during cross-examination,
and it is then up to the jury to weigh the testimony and determine which of the views they believe.
VII. ELEMENTS OF DAMAGE
In partial taking cases we have seen that in following the
formula for damages the jury must add to the value of the tract
taken the difference between the fair market value of the remainder of the land before and after taking.
In determining the diminution in value of the remainder
it has been held that the jury may take into account every element of annoyance and disadvantage resulting from the taking
which would influence an intending purchaser's estimate of the
market valtie. 26 However, the elements cannot be considered as
independent items of damage, but only to the extent that, taken
as a whole, they detract from the market value of the property. 27
Some confusion occurs where the landowner suffers so-called
"incidental" damages as a direct result of a taking by the condemner. Although the landowner suffers damage, the courts will
not allow proof of the damage unless it affects the market value
of the land. This is true even in a state, like Nebraska, which
has the "taken or damaged" clause in its constitution.2 8 Removal
expenses, loss due to temporary interruption of business and loss
2t

Mendelman v. Stanton-Pilger Drainage Dist., 155 Neb. 518, 52 N.W.2d

328 (1952).
26 Quest v. East Omaha Drainage Dist., 155 Neb. 538, 52 N.W.2d 417

(1952); Luchsinger v. Loup River Public Power Dist., 140 Neb. 179,
299 N.W. 549 (1941); Asche v. Loup River Public Power Dist., 136 Neb.
601, 287 N.W. 64 (1939); 18 Am. Jur., Eminent Domain, 282 (1938).
27

Crawford v. Central Neb. Public Power and Irrigation Dist., 154 Neb.

28

Mohler v. Board of Regents of University of Nebraska, 102 Neb. 12, 165
N.W. 954 (1917); 1 Orgel, Valuation under Eminent Domain, 66 et seq.
(2d ed. 1953).

832, 49 N.W.2d 682 (1951).
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of good will are typical examples of uncompensated "incidental"
damages.
Although our constitution does not require payment of compensation to the landowner who suffers "incidental" damages
which do not affect the market value of his land, some states
have passed special legislation extending compensation to these
"incidental" damages. Such legislation has been upheld upon
the ground that, "It is not forbidden to be just in some cases
where it is not required to be by the letter of paramoint law." --9
VIII.

CONCLUSION

In this short article, an effort has been made to forewarn
the lawyer of the presence of several common pitfalls which await
him unless he and the appraiser witness are adequately prepared
to deliver a well coordinated presentation of the facts affecting
the value of the property. In the words of Francis X Busch:
With anything short of that kind of preparation you may find
30
your parachute dropping and the pull cord out of order.

29

Earl v. Commonwealth, 180 Mass. 579, 63 N.E. 10 (1902).

30 Francis X. Busch, "Selection of an Expert Witness", 15 Alabama Law-

yer 37, 46 (1954).
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